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Abstract 
 
Regulatory and funding asymmetries in the Spanish 
motorway network produce huge differences in the structure 
of gasoline markets by motorway type: free or toll. While 
competition is encouraged among gas stations on free 
motorways, the regulations for toll motorways allow private 
concessionaires to auction all gas stations to the same 
provider, thereby limiting competition and consolidating 
market power. This paper reports how this regulatory 
asymmetry results in higher prices and fewer gas stations. 
Specifically, we show that competition is constrained on toll 
motorways by the granting of geographical monopolies, 
resulting in a small number of rivals operating in close 
proximity to each other, and allowing gas stations to operate 
as local monopolies. The lack of competition would seem to 
account for the price differential between toll and free 
motorways. According to available evidence, deregulation 
measures affecting toll motorway concessions could help to 
mitigate price inefficiencies and increase consumer welfare. 
JEL classification: L11, L12, L43 
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Introduction
The gasoline market is a major energy market in any economy, both for its domestic 
consumers (since the product represents a significant expense for families) and for its productive 
sector (since it represents an essential input in most production processes1
The European Commission goes as far as recognizing that fuel retailing on motorways should 
be considered a separate product market owing to the distinctive competitive conditions that 
characterize a motorway
). Given the 
importance therefore of fostering an efficient gasoline market, competition policies must serve to 
prevent the development of market power and anticompetitive strategies that might harm 
consumer welfare. Likewise, it is essential to guarantee the efficient performance of the specific 
gasoline market made up by the motorway network, given that motorways hold a particularly high 
volume of consumers that also require protection. 
2
The gasoline retailing market is local in scope and the substitutability between gas stations is 
geographically limited. Nonetheless, the overlap between the areas of influence of the stations 
provides potential for competition on a motorway. This competition is constrained in two ways: 
first, by high entry barriers due to the “insulated” nature of the motorway and the specific 
characteristics of the infrastructure that make building a new site on a motorway (sunk costs) 
more expensive; and, second, the regulatory framework that limits free entry. The first of these 
constraints are industry-based, while the latter are legal and regulatory barriers.
. First, demand is captive, insofar as motorists rarely leave the 
motorway to buy fuel from a gas station sited in a location off the motorway; and, second, 
motorists travel on motorways for reasons of speed, and so are disinclined or less willing to waste 
time in refueling. If, moreover, the motorists have paid a toll, this outlay serves as a further 
deterrent to their exiting the motorway. These characteristics, which combine to make gasoline 
retailing on motorways a separate market, usually result in higher prices at the pump.
Yet, even with these entry barriers and the characteristics that make a motorway a separate 
market, in most European countries no significant price differences are found between gas 
stations located on and off the motorway network. In fact, price differences are only significant in 
countries in which large shares of the network are privately tolled. For instance, prices are 
between 5 and 10% higher in French gas stations located on toll motorways. Additionally, 
1 According to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade the consumption of petroleum products in 2008 
represented 56.6% of final energy consumption and 47.9% of primary energy consumption.
2 European Commission decisions on September 29th, 1999 and February 9th, 2000 regarding 
concentration operations affecting Exxon/Mobile and TotalFina/Elf, respectively.
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according to the EC (1999), their retail prices are unconnected to price trends in the neighboring 
market of off-motorway stations. 
Clearly, the fact of having paid a motorway toll makes motorists reluctant to leave the motorway 
in search of low price gas stations on the adjacent roads. However, these gas stations are not the 
only potential source of competition for gas stations located on motorways. Indeed, the 
motorway’s competitive framework can also influence gasoline retail price setting. This justifies 
policies encouraging the liberalization and the promotion and defense of competition not only on 
conventional (rural or urban) roads, but also on high capacity roads. 
Concerns related to such competition on toll motorways have recently been raised in Spain, a 
country that operates a mixed funding model of motorways with a large part of the network being 
privately tolled. Both the National Commission for Energy (CNE) and the National Competition 
Commission (CNC) – Spain’s regulatory agencies responsible for the energy market and 
competition policy respectively, have explored market power and price settings on toll motorways. 
Their conclusions warn of significant markups (i.e., high prices charged by gas stations on toll 
motorways) and stress the high concentration indices that exist on roads of this type. However, 
these studies are based on a single or, at most, a few specific toll motorways and typically they 
compare prices at gas stations on toll motorways with the national mean for all gas stations.
The aim of this paper is to determine whether the fuel prices charged to toll motorway users are 
significantly higher than those charged to non-toll motorway users in Spain given this apparent 
lack of competition. We construct and exploit a new database for all gas stations located on 
motorways – both free and toll – and estimate a price equation controlling for the real competitive 
framework enjoyed by each gas station. As the mixed funding model of motorways (free and 
privately tolled) results in a regulatory asymmetry as regards the respective legal entry barriers in 
place, the hypothesis we test is that gas stations on toll motorways charge higher prices not only 
because of their demand and cost characteristics, but also because of the uncompetitive market 
in which they operate as a consequence of this regulatory asymmetry. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. This is the first study to attempt to measure the market 
power of toll motorway gas stations arising from the asymmetry in market entry regulations. This 
means while toll motorway companies can award gas station concessions, free motorways are 
characterized by entry-friendly regulations that seek to promote competition. The exercise is 
conducted for Spanish motorways, which enables us to undertake a good comparison of the 
different entry barriers in a mixed funding model. Thus, we do not compare gas stations on- and 
off-motorways, but rather we conduct our comparison of gas stations sited in infrastructure of the 
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same quality and physical features, the only difference being that some of the motorways are free 
while others are toll roads. 
Our findings, and their associated policy implications, can be extended to other countries that 
operate similar funding models for their motorways based on private concessions, including 
France, Italy and Portugal, and to developing countries that have found in private initiative and 
user payments a source of funding for large necessary infrastructure projects. Moreover, our 
findings are relevant to other developed economies (for example, the recent concessions 
awarded in the US) that have recently introduced the user-charging model as a means of funding 
motorway investment.
The second contribution of this paper is methodological. Within the broad body of literature that 
has studied the fuel retailing market, only Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004) used the 
geographical distance between gas stations to control for the effective competition affecting price 
setting. Here, we not only extend this strategy by using a continuum of distances to identify the 
spatial role of competition (which we consider of great importance for a local market), we also 
relax their exogeneity assumption regarding the number of rivals, an assumption recognized as 
being a limitation by Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004). Indeed, both the price and the number of 
sellers in a market are endogenous variables and so we adopt an instrumental variables approach 
to avoid estimation bias.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish motorway 
network in order to understand its mixed funding model and the source of its competitive 
framework. Next, in section 3, we explain the different regulatory frameworks applied to free and 
toll motorways so as to highlight the asymmetries affecting their entry barriers. In this same 
section, we also present information describing the market structure of each motorway type, while 
in section 4 we briefly review the conclusions of previous reports undertaken by regulatory 
agencies. Our data and methods are described in sections 5 and 6 respectively, and our results 
are presented in section 7. Finally, we conclude by reviewing the main contributions of this paper 
and we discuss the various policy implications and recommendations that can be derived from our 
study.
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1. Spain’s mixed funding model for motorways: The source of regulatory 
asymmetry in gasoline competition
Spain’s transportation system presents several distinctive characteristics that make it unique in 
Europe. Among these features is its mixed funding model for motorways, which means that a 
significant share of its motorways are toll roads operated by private concessionaires, and a 
significant proportion are free motorways under public management and funding3. This mixed 
model is not the planned outcome of a particular design for its road system but rather reflects 
different stages in the country’s transport policy4. The first motorways were awarded to private 
firms by the dictatorship in the late 60s and early 70s because of a lack of public resources (given 
the precarious fiscal system then in operation) to fund the investments. These first projects, 
undertaken as part of the Program of Spanish National Motorways (PANE)5
After a period of financial meltdowns, the nationalization of some concessions and the 
renegotiation of others (a process that affected both the tolls and the length of contracts), the 
country adopted a publicly funded model, but without compromising the toll motorways already 
operating. This change was instigated by the Socialist Party, which held power between 1982 and 
1996. Given its skepticism regarding private initiative, the new government designed a plan for the 
construction of a network of free motorways and the nationalization of three toll companies 
experiencing financial troubles in 1984.
, foresaw the building 
of motorways primarily in the busiest routes, including the Mediterranean corridor and the Ebro 
River Valley corridor, but also on other routes such as those linking Seville to Cadis (in southern 
Spain), Villalba to Adanero (in the Madrid area), and Bilbao to San Sebastian (in the Basque 
Country). This preference for pay-per-use and private operation was suddenly undermined by the 
economic crisis of the mid-seventies, which saw construction and maintenance costs rise well 
above private forecasts severely damaging the nascent industry. As a result, by 1975, only 2,042 
km of toll motorways from the total of 6,340 initially planned had been completed.
6
3 Toll motorways constitute significant share of other European countries’ networks, including France, 
Greece, Portugal and Italy. However, in these countries almost the whole network is tolled, while in Spain 
the system presents significant shares of both funding models. 
  This provision of free motorways funded and maintained 
by the State was financially feasible due to tax system reforms in 1977 and the arrival of 
European funds for projects in four regional areas (Castile-La Mancha, Andalusia, Castile-Leon
and Valencia). 
4 See Bel (1999) and Bel and Fageda (2005) for a full description of these stages.
5 The Program of Spanish National Motorways (1967) planned more than 3,000 km of toll motorways. The 
program was up-dated in 1972 in the National Plan of Motorways, increasing the planned length to 6,340 
km. 
6 The toll motorway concessionaries nationalized were Audasa, Audenasa and Aucalsa. 
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The Government’s General Road Plan (1984-1991) established the public funding model for 
new motorways and generated a mixed motorway system with some corridors being served by toll 
motorways and other by free motorways. The outcome of this policy was a clear distribution of 
motorways reflecting the particular funding method. In 1991, the last year of the Plan, free 
motorways accounted for 67% (3,844 km) of the total motorway network. 
Since that date, a number of specific policies have favored the return to the pay-per-use model. 
The general renegotiations for extending private concessions in the 1997 Program of Toll 
Motorways, drawn up by Partido Popular (Conservative Party); the privatization of Spain’s 
National Motorway Company in 2003 – owner of the three motorways nationalized in 1984; and 
the awarding of new toll motorways along several corridors in the late 90s and early years of the 
last decade have shaped the current mixed model. 
2. Entry regulation asymmetry and market structure
This mixed model for funding motorways has a considerable impact on the regulation of gas 
stations on these roads and on the competition framework of petrol suppliers. While gas stations 
on toll motorways can be contracted directly by the private concessionaire to retail suppliers (in 
accordance with the terms of concession), gas stations on free motorways are the responsibility of 
the State. In the case of toll motorways, Law 8/72 grants the private toll motorway company the 
right to contract these services. Typically, such companies organize auctions for the operation of 
all the gas stations on a particular motorway or those in certain geographical sections. This 
strategy, as well as ensuring gas stations are located at some distance from each other, allows 
geographical monopolies to be sold and guarantees greater value than a competitive supply. 
Here, Kay and Thomas (1986), in discussing privatization policies, claim that a seller concerned 
with maximizing its revenue cannot be expected to support calls for liberalization. Thus, we should 
not expect toll motorway companies to facilitate a competitive framework when determining their 
contracting strategy. 
A good example of this strategy in operation is provided by the recent concession of three of the 
four gas stations on the A8 motorway linking Bilbao with Irún to CEPSA, one of the leading petrol 
providers in Spain. This contract grants the operation of this service free of competition on the 
sixty-kilometer stretch through the province of Guipuzcoa for a period of 15 years. The fourth gas 
station is operated by Petronor and is located in the province of Vizcaya, 15 km from Bilbao. In 
fact, this is also the only operator in a sixty-kilometer stretch and, as such, Petronor and CEPSA 
operate as geographic monopolies on the Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa sections of the motorway and 
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are located far enough from each other (44 km) to avoid competition. Additionally, the toll 
motorway company (Bidegi) has committed itself to prevent any new market entry by ruling out 
the building of any new gas stations on this motorway. Among others, this contract included the 
most profitable gas station in Spain at that time (2003)7
By contrast, entry regulations on free motorways are considerably more complex and include a 
variety of norms that favor competition among petrol suppliers. According to Royal Decree 
1812/1994, the awarding of new service areas – including gas stations – has to be regulated and 
executed by public auction. The decision to initiate an auction for a gas station on a free 
motorway depends on several factors: population density, distribution and characteristics of 
population, and average daily traffic (Article 4, Royal Decree 15/1999). In order to promote 
competition, Royal Decree 15/1999 contains a number of liberalization measures favoring new 
entrants in these auctions. Specifically, it favors a gas station provider that is different from the 
two nearest gas stations to that particular site. In addition, the Decree promotes public auctions 
for the awarding of various gas stations in a given service area and the auction of service areas 
with an existing monopolistic incumbent. As such, it is possible to find more than one gas station 
provider in the same service area on free motorways.
. As a result, Bidegi will obtain annual 
revenues of 9.5 million euros until 2018.
Additional efforts have been made by the government to prevent market power abuses in this 
sector and to favor competition on the free motorways for which it has responsibility:
1) The placing of information panels on the motorways displaying details about the location of 
different gas stations and their prices provide market transparency and reduce drivers’ 
search costs (Royal Decree 15/1999)
2) Public auctions not only consider the variety of operators in the relevant market, as provided 
for under Royal Decree 15/1999, but also favor entrants committed to avoiding the provision 
of petrol from the same upstream provider as the immediately previous and following 
stations on the same side of the motorway.
3) Finally, the government has restricted the entry of gas station companies with a market 
share greater than 15% (Royal Decree 6/2000). The period established was five years in 
the case of companies enjoying a market share greater than 30% and three years in the 
case of those with a market share above 15% but lower than 30%.
7 See the article “Guipúzcoa abrirá en diciembre con peaje la A-1 con un tramo sin desdoblar” published in 
El País 30/10/2003. 
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These attempts to promote liberalization and the differences in entry regulation have obvious 
consequences for the market structure. Table 1 summarizes the respective market structures of 
toll and free motorways. The following points are worth stressing:8
a) The average number of rivals for a gas station on a toll motorway is five times lower than 
that for stations on free motorways. 
b) The percentage of gas stations without rivals on a 50-km stretch of motorway is three times 
higher on the toll motorways than it is on free motorways. In fact, more than 60% of gas 
stations on tolled motorways have no rivals within this distance. 
c) When another gas station does operate within a 50-km stretch, the chances that it is 
operated by the same brand are very high on a toll motorway. Specifically, only 31.25% of 
gas stations do not have another own-brand petrol station operating within this distance. By 
contrast, this share increases to 50.85% on free motorways, which is indicative of the 
variety of suppliers to be found on these roads. 
d) Finally, the average price charged to toll users is more than 1% higher than that charged to 
free motorway users.
<<Insert Table 1 about here>>
Similarly, Figure 1 shows the number of rivals a gas station must compete with within a given 
distance.9 This shows that operators on free motorways must contend with higher competition 
due to a larger number of close rivals, while those on toll motorways are protected from such 
competition by distance, thereby, safeguarding their geographic monopolistic rents. Indeed, the 
figure stresses how unlikely it is to find competition on toll motorways within a 50-km stretch. By 
contrast, the number of rivals increases much more steeply over 50 kilometers on free 
motorways. Likewise, Figure 2 shows the percentage number of gas stations without competition 
by type of motorway over a 50-km stretch. It is readily apparent that the share of gas stations 
without competition on tolled motorways remains largely constant across all distances, while gas 
stations on free motorways face competition even at short distances. Thus, at the end of this 50-
km stretch, we find that 63.9% of gas stations on toll motorways do not face any competition, 
while this is true of only 14.75% of those on free motorways.
8 This information is drawn from the specially constructed database that is used in the econometric analysis 
(see, section 5). The database contains data for all gas stations in Spain’s motorway network.
9 Note, a rival is understood to be a petrol station operated by a different brand.
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<<Insert Figure 1 about here >>
<<Insert Figure 2 about here >>
Figures 3 and 4 provide an interesting description of the number and share of own-brand gas 
stations located on a given motorway by distance in relation to each station. As can be seen, it is 
difficult to identify any variety on toll motorways, while on free motorways the percentage of own 
gas stations falls at a much faster rate.
<<Insert Figure 3 about here >>
<<Insert Figure 4 about here >>
In order to illustrate the different market structures generated by the regulatory asymmetry, we 
compared two substitute motorways. 
<<Insert Table 2 about here>>
We take the A2 (free) and AP2 (toll) motorways that serve the corridor linking Barcelona with 
Lleida – two provincial capitals in the northeastern part of Spain. Note that the distances covered 
and the journey times are very similar (Table 2). However, we find almost twice as many gas 
stations on the free motorway as on the toll motorway. Moreover, the concentration indexes (HHI, 
C1, C2, C3) describe a quite distinct competitive structure, so that all the gas stations on the toll 
motorway are operated by the same brand and so there is no competition along the whole of this 
stretch of the AP2. The outcome of this is a much higher average price (+3.2%) at the pumps on 
the tolled motorway than on the free motorway. This difference is more pronounced in the 
operating margin, calculated as the final price without taxes minus the international wholesale 
price. Table 3 extends this analysis by showing the average concentration indices by type of 
motorway for all motorways on which at least two gas stations are sited. Although we cannot 
conclude that all gas stations on free motorways operate under a competitive framework, our 
results identify major differences demonstrating that concentration is much higher on toll 
motorways than it is on free roads.
<<Insert Table 3 about here>>
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In short, entry regulation asymmetries seem to affect the market structure and the competitive 
framework in which road users and petrol providers interact. The lack of competition derived from 
the freedom granted to toll companies to award gas stations without any additional competition 
measures results in fewer gas stations per kilometer stretch of motorway, higher prices and less 
variety of suppliers. The combined effect of this is to induce market power gains, higher private 
rents and a reduction in road user welfare.
3. Official reports on gas station competition
Three official reports have been undertaken to date in an attempt at addressing concerns about 
the high market concentration of gas stations on toll motorways. 
The lack of entry regulations and the absence of competition on toll motorways were recognized 
in a report drawn up by the Catalan Competition Court (2005) (TDC). The report highlighted the 
fact that concessionaires had the right to permit (or otherwise) the opening of new gas stations on 
toll motorways, which allowed them, in most instances, to creating monopolies of gas station 
groups on the different toll motorways.
In a second report, the National Energy Commission (2008)10
Finally, the most recent reports have been undertaken by the National Competition Commission 
(2009 and 2011) (CNC)
reviewed competition and price 
setting at gas stations on the toll motorway linking Barcelona with La Jonquera. They concluded 
that prices were 2.35 and 2.85 €/liter higher for gasoline and diesel respectively than the national 
mean. This micro-study added that the commercial markup was also 1.12 €/liter higher than the 
national mean for gasoline and 0.72 €/liter in the case of diesel.
11
10 The National Energy Commission (CNE) is the independent regulatory agency for energy markets in 
Spain.
. They analyzed the overall market of gasoline supply in Spain and its 
regulation. Some of the partial results presented by the 2009 and 2011 reports regarding the 
competition and market structure on motorways have a direct bearing on our study here. The 
reports, for example, stress the importance of the body with responsibility for each motorway as 
the determining factor of market structure in the interurban road network, while finding the degree 
of market concentration on several toll motorways to be very high. One such instance of this is the 
toll motorway, the AP-36, which has three station areas along a stretch of 145 kilometers that are 
served by the same provider (CEPSA). Similarly, on the Tarragona-Valencia (148 km) and 
11 The National Competition Commission (CNC) is the independent agency in charge of the Competition 
Policy in Spain. 
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Málaga-Estepona (82 km) toll motorways there are only three gas stations (in each direction) 
belonging to the same provider (CEPSA and Repsol, respectively).
The CNC reports recommend that stronger measures be taken to reduce the high degree of 
concentration in interurban markets by eliminating the possibility of awarding concessions to gas 
stations from the same supplier. Although the 2009 report does not refer directly to toll motorways 
– since it is solely concerned with roads under State responsibility, it clearly considers this to be 
an anticompetitive strategy that must be avoided given the harm it inflicts on consumers. In fact, 
the CNC (2011) claims that the criteria according to which the same provider should not supply 
consecutive gas stations is not being adhered to sufficiently, with only between 5 and 10% of the 
overall weighting in the bidding clauses being given to it.
4. Data
The empirical implementation requires a considerable volume of data. The first step in 
constructing the database involved identifying each gas station located on any section of 
motorway (be it tolled or free) in Spain’s network. To locate the service stations we used Google 
Earth software and a Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade application that shows the 
geographical location of all gas stations in Spain. In this way we noted the geographical position 
(latitude and longitude) for each gas station (n=1,220), the side of the road on which it is located 
(left or right), the brand operating the station and its opening hours. All these details were 
available for all gas stations located on both toll and free motorways. 
We also noted the retail price of unleaded 95 octane gasoline sold at each station. We collected 
the retail price of this product since it is, by some way, the most widely consumed in the Spanish 
market12
The availability of the geographical position of each of the outlets allows us to obtain a range of 
additional information that is essential for our empirical analysis. First, we calculated the number 
of rival and same-brand gas stations in a distance ranging from 1 to 50 kilometers. Drawing on the 
. Unfortunately, not all the gas stations provide price details, which can create a selection 
bias in our database. However, a simple inspection of the gas stations not reporting prices shows 
that this lack of information can be considered random, i.e., it does not follow any particular 
pattern. As such, there would appear to be no problem of sample selection that might bias our 
results.
12 In 2009, unleaded 95 octane gasoline accounted for 89.2% of total petrol consumption in Spain. This 
information was obtained from CORES, the public company that controls petroleum product stocks in 
Spain.
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latitude and longitude details for each station we calculated the Euclidean distance from each of 
the petrol stations to the other 1,219, using MATLAB software. The matrix, containing 1,488,400 
distance measurements, allows us to calculate the number of rival and own-brand gas stations 
located between 1 and 50 kilometers from each station. 
We should stress that we considered only those stations located on the same motorway and 
then those sited on the same side of the road (i.e., serving traffic going in the same direction). 
This step was taken for two main reasons: first, to avoid counting as rival or as own-brand gas 
stations those sited directly opposite each other but on different sides of the motorway, and, 
secondly, to avoid including in the same market area two service stations that while close 
geographically are located on different motorways, so that consumers in fact have no choice 
between the two. This step might, however, generate problems in the case of service stations 
located near the intersection of two motorways. But given that the number of such stations is 
highly limited, we preferred to maintain the assumption that competition is limited to petrol stations 
located on the same motorway and serving the traffic going in one particular direction. The 
information contained in the distance matrix therefore allows us to identify the brand of the 
nearest rival to each of the 1,220 stations.
Average daily traffic data were obtained from the road map database of the General Directorate 
of Traffic (DGT), which forms part of the Spanish Ministry of Transportation. This database reports 
information collected by control stations on traffic volume, speed and safety outcomes. In order to 
control for potential demand we selected the closest control station (minimum number of 
kilometers) to each gas station and used the average daily traffic (ADT) recording.
Finally, we also obtained the distances between each of the stations and the gasoline storage 
facilities that exist in Spain. This variable accounts for the cost of transporting gasoline. To obtain 
this information we geo-referenced each storage point using its address as listed on the website 
of the National Energy Commission (CNE). 
5. Methods 
The regulatory differences between toll motorways and free motorways have a significant impact 
on the number of petrol stations in their respective networks and on the distribution of these 
stations among the various brands. In the previous section, we showed that there is a lower 
density of gas stations and a higher level of market concentration on the toll roads. But how do 
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these two characteristics affect the prices charged by the service stations? Does less market 
competition have a negative effect on consumers?
To answer these questions we analyze how the number of rivals located at various distances 
from a given gas station affects the prices it fixes. This empirical approach has been used by 
Barron et al. (2004) to determine whether U.S. gas stations set lower prices when the density of 
competitors in a  1.5-mile radius is higher. However, unlike the aforementioned study, we treat the 
number of rivals and the number of own-brand gas stations as endogenous variables13
Following Barron et al. (2004), to analyze the extent to which the level of competition can affect 
the prices set by the petrol station and, hence, the consumer surplus, we estimated the following 
econometric model:
.
0 1 2AV i i j i j iP NoRivals NoOwnBrand X         (1)
where the average price (PAV) set by petrol station "i" depends on the number of rivals within a 
certain distance ( iNoRivals )14
iNoOwnBrand
, the number of own-brand petrol stations within the same distance 
( ) and other exogenous factors ( jXi ).
It should be borne in mind that both the number of rivals and the number of own-brand petrol 
stations located in a particular area are clearly endogenous variables. To solve this problem of 
endogeneity we use a two-stage estimation procedure employing an instrumental variables 
method. The instruments used in the first stage of the estimation are the GDP per capita in the 
province, the nearest traffic density measurement, an index capturing the intensity of tourism in 
the province in which the gas station is located, and a set of dummy variables used to measure 
the nearest rival brand15
The remaining exogenous variables introduced into the model are:
. These instruments are used both for the number of rivals and for the 
number of own-brand gas stations in different markets. These variables are strongly correlated 
with the number of stations (both rival and own-brand) but are not correlated with the prices set at 
the pumps.
13 Other studies that have used the distance form their rivals as a proxy of the level of competition include 
Sheppard (1991), Barron et al. (2000), Perdiguero and Borrell (2012) and Jiménez and Perdiguero (2010).
14 In Spain there is no competition between stations of the same brand. The prices of these petrol stations 
are set directly or indirectly by the wholesale operator, which ensures perfect coordination between the 
petrol stations of the same brand located within a certain radius.
15 We use the tourism intensity index compiled as part of the Annual Municipal Database by “La Caixa” 
corrected by population.
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- Dtoll: A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the station is located on a toll motorway 
and zero otherwise. If consumers who use toll roads are more willing to pay, they will be 
equally willing to pay a higher price for gasoline. Similarly, if toll road users have a higher 
valuation of time, they will not want to spend time looking for a cheaper petrol station and 
will be equally willing to pay more for gasoline. As a result, we expect a positive 
relationship between this binary variable and the average price.
- D24h: A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the station is open 24 hours a day and 
zero otherwise. The fact that a gas station is open all day is an element of product 
differentiation that allows a station to charge higher prices. Moreover, such stations may 
well incur higher operating costs that are transferred to pump prices. We expect this 
variable to be positively correlated with the average price.
- DBrand: A set of dummy variables for each brand type. We have different types of brands: 
those who have refining capacity in Spain (Repsol, Cepsa and BP); those that operate a 
network of petrol stations but which have no refining capacity in Spain (Galp and Shell), 
and those that do not own more than two or three service stations, that we named 
‘independents’. The sign of their impact on average prices is expected to depend on the 
ability of consumers to make informed assessments of the quality of different brands. If 
consumers believe that the major brands (who have refining capacity in Spain) offer a 
higher quality product, they will be willing to pay a higher price.
- Dist.Storage: A variable that measures the distance between the point of sale and the nearest 
gasoline storage center. The stations that are furthest from the storage incur higher 
transportation costs, which will be transferred to pump prices. However, it should be borne 
in mind that this cost will be an extremely small percentage of the total product cost. 
Moreover, it should not be ruled out that the carrier sets uniform prices in large areas, 
which might mean the variable lacks any statistical significance16
We estimate two approximations: the simplest one includes just the number of rivals, the number 
of own-brand outlets and the dummy variables for the different brands; while the second 
estimation includes all the above variables.
.
17
16 The Ministry of Industry, Trade and New Technologies of the Canary Islands Government report a 
uniform price (2004).
17 Alternative approximations with the progressive introduction of exogenous variables do not give different 
results.
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6. Results
The econometric results are presented in Tables 4a and 4b. We show the results for markets 
defined by 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 kilometer stretches of motorway. All other market definitions do 
not affect our main results18.
<<Insert Table 4a about here>>
<<Insert Table 4b about here>>
These results show that the number of rivals has a statistically significant negative effect on the 
average price fixed at the pumps by gas stations. By contrast, the number of own-brand gas 
stations within a given distance allows a station to set higher prices. These two variables were 
considered endogenous; however, the Hansen and the Anderson statistics indicate that the 
instruments used are valid, thus solving the problem of endogeneity and demonstrating the 
robustness of our estimates.
The fact that the first of these variables (the number of rivals) is negative and statistically 
significant indicates that the presence of stations operated by other brands has a competitive 
effect that is reflected in a lower equilibrium price. Thus, spatial competition in local motorway 
markets matters and improves consumer welfare. This finding is in keeping with that reported by 
Barron et al. (2004), who found that a higher density of gas stations in a 1.5-mile radius resulted 
in lower market prices. Our results also show how the impact of competitors is diluted and 
mitigated as rival gas stations are located further apart. By contrast, we find a positive and 
statistically significant effect of same-brand service stations on average prices due to their ability 
to coordinate local market power. 
These results indicate that low station densities and high concentration indices account for the 
price differential existing on free and toll motorways. Thus, toll motorways have fewer stations 
and, therefore, fewer competitors that ensure geographical market power and a higher equilibrium 
price. 
A second important result was obtained for the binary variable, Dtoll, which is positive but not 
statistically significant in all cases. This result indicates that service stations sited on toll 
motorways are not consistently more expensive if they have the same market structure as those 
18 Results for the distance continuum (km) and for longer distances are provided upon request.
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located on a free motorway (ceteris paribus). Table 5 shows that the toll variable is positive and 
statistically significant if we estimate the same models without the competition variables.
<< Insert Table 5 about here>>
This finding is important because it suggests that the price differential between toll and free 
motorways cannot be accounted for by differences in supply and demand factors but rather is 
attributable to the difference in the levels of competition on both roadways. Thus, were we to 
ensure the same the levels of competition on free and toll motorways, prices would be equal. 
Additionally , we find that petrol stations that operate 24 hours a day charge significantly higher 
prices (albeit only half a penny). It is reasonable to assume that stations that remain open around 
the clock incur higher costs and that this is reflected in higher prices. Note, however, that the 
distance to the storage center was found not to be a statistically significant variable. 
To determine the impact rival stations have on the prices charged by a given gas station, we 
performed a simulation to see what prices would be fixed by a gas station if all its neighboring 
stations were own-brand outlets. This simulation (transformation of all stations to own-brand 
outlets) has two effects: on the one hand, it has a positive effect on prices because of the close
proximity of stations of the same brand; on the other hand, it has a negative effect on the prices of 
its closest lying rivals. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 4.
<<Figure 4 insert here>>
As we can see, prices would rise significantly if a gas station’s closest rivals were own-brand 
petrol stations: prices would climb more than 5 per cent if all rivals in a 20-kilometer stretch were 
own-brand outlets. If we take this 5 per cent as the ‘small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in prices’ (SSNIP TEST) that defines the relevant market, then only 14.6 per cent of the 
gas stations on toll motorways have rivals, which leaves 85.4 per cent with no competition in the 
relevant market. In the case of free motorways, the percentage with rivals increases to 74.2 per 
cent, with just 25.8 per cent of stations operating without competition in the relevant 20-kilometer 
market.
The small size of relevant markets in the gasoline industry has previously been noted by Barron 
et al (2004), Bromiley et al (2002), Jiménez and Perdiguero (2011) and Perdiguero and Borrell 
(2012)19
19 Even in the gasoline wholesale market, the market size has been reported as being very local (see, for 
example, Spiller and Huang, 1986, or Pinks et al, 2002).
. While the impact of rival stations is limited to an area defined by an 8- to 24-kilometer 
stretch with a maximum impact within a 14-kilometer stretch, it must be considered doubtful as to 
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whether there is any competition at all on toll roads, since virtually no service station encounters 
rivals within this range of displacement. Only 11.25 per cent of petrol stations on toll roads have a 
rival within a 14-kilometer stretch, and this proportion increases only to 20.6 percent if the market 
is expanded to a 24-kilometer stretch. These results contrast with those obtained for gas stations 
on free motorways where more than 66 per cent have a rival within a 14-kilometer stretch, 
increasing to 77 percent in a displacement range of 24 kilometers. 
To determine whether gas stations on toll roads act as isolated monopolies, we adopted the 
following approach.
0 1 2 3AV i i i j i j iP Before After Both X          
where AVP is the average price set by each station and which depends on iBefore , a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the previous petrol station is operated by another brand, iAfter ,
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the following petrol station is operated by another 
brand, iBoth , a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if both the previous and following petrol 
stations are operated by another brand, and a set of control variables including dummy variables 
for the different brands and a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the case of diesel fuel and 
0 in the case of gasoline. This equation was estimated separately for toll and free motorways. The 
results are shown in Table 6.
<<Insert Table 6 about here>>
As the above table shows, while stations located on toll motorways do not fix significantly 
different prices when the nearest petrol stations are operated by different brands, the prices fixed 
at the pumps by petrol stations on free motorways are lower. This indicates that toll motorway 
service stations act as isolated monopolies whose prices do not depend on the brand of the 
nearest petrol station. As such, a change in the ownership of the gas stations would not result in a 
significant price reduction, yet the entry of new competitors, located at sites close to their rivals, 
would be an effective way of reducing equilibrium prices.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that the prices charged by gas stations on tolled motorways are 
significantly higher than those charged by stations on free motorways given the prevailing 
conditions of insufficient competition. This has been illustrated by examining data from Spain, a 
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country that operates a mixed funding model of motorways of similar quality, which has ensured 
the reliability of the comparison. The difference reported does not, however, appear to reflect the 
respective characteristics of demand and sunk costs of the two systems but rather the lack of 
competition attributable to the asymmetry in Spanish entry regulations governing free and toll 
motorways. 
The right retained by toll motorway concessionaires of awarding concessions for the gas 
stations sited within their infrastructure allows them to maximize the revenues obtained from this 
operation by creating local monopolies. They are able to establish this uncompetitive market by 
locating gas stations at sufficient distances from each other so as to avoid any competition. 
Moreover, the typical practice has been to award gas station concessions on a given motorway, 
or at least on given sections of a motorway, to the same brand. By contrast, market entry on free 
motorways is governed by Ministry of Industry regulations, which have imposed an increasing 
number of measures to ensure competition in recent years. These differences between toll and 
free motorways have a critical impact on market structure and, as a consequence, on the price 
charged to gas station users.
Our results have a number of interesting policy implications. The presence of toll motorways 
around the world is rising both in developing countries, unable to invest heavily in transport 
infrastructure, as well as in developed countries, due to their fiscal restrictions and investment 
needs. Tolls instituted for these reasons are typically associated with private sector involvement 
and the use of standard Build-Operate-and-Transfer franchise schemes (Engel et al., 2004). In 
the US, for instance, interest in toll motorways is particularly intense. Indeed, several toll 
motorway concessions have been awarded over the last decade (the Indiana Toll Road and 
Chicago Skyway, among others) and others are under discussion, including multi-billion dollar 
deals involving toll roads in Pennsylvania and Texas.
Our findings and their associated policy implications can be extrapolated to other countries 
operating similar funding models for motorways based on private concessions, such as France, 
Italy and Portugal, and where similar franchising models are used, but where the absence of a 
sizeable free motorway network prevents average price comparisons.
Our results suggest that awarding private companies the right to franchise and design gas 
stations on toll motorways is tantamount to accepting an uncompetitive market structure and, 
hence, the charging of higher fuel prices to users already paying a toll. Regulatory measures 
governing the distances between gas stations and providing restrictions on market concentration 
need to be introduced to avoid market power abuse in the retailing of fuel on motorways. Such a 
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policy is even more necessary in countries such as Spain where alternative free interurban 
motorways in the corridors parallel to the tolled motorway do not always exist.
However, it should be recognized that the introduction of such a competition policy would 
reduce the extraordinary revenues of toll motorway companies acquired through the contracting 
of service stations, since they would no longer be able to offer a monopoly. As a result, toll 
motorway companies might well have to raise their tolls, making it necessary to estimate the 
welfare impacts associated with a trade-off between high tolls and high fuel prices. 
Moreover, this policy would be extremely difficult to implement where concession contracts 
remain in force, since rights have already been awarded. In addition, the specific characteristics 
of the service area infrastructure on toll motorways would severely hinder the construction of new 
service stations. No doubt this would act as a constraint on new market entrants, but once 
retailing contracts expire, it would be possible to limit market concentration and increase the 
number of rivals on a given motorway or section of motorway. However, it should be borne in 
mind that introducing new entrants on toll motorways would imply major investment in
infrastructure given the technical characteristics involved.
However, having said this, our policy implications are more readily applicable to experiences in 
which these rights have yet to be awarded, especially in the case of developing countries in the
planning stages of toll motorway projects. The latter are in a position, therefore, to design a 
regulatory framework that can limit uncompetitive behavior by fixing the number of gas stations 
and restricting the distance between them. They might also impose rivalry requirements –
perhaps prohibiting the location of two gas stations of the same brand in close proximity to each 
other. The only pitfall to this strategy is that tolls might rise accordingly while governments in 
developing countries might be more interested in keeping tolls as low as possible rather than in 
ensuring a competitive fuel retailing market on their motorways. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Market structure, geographic competition by type of motorway
Toll Free
Mean rivals < 50 km 0.68 3.80
% gas stations without rivals < 50 km 63.92 14.75
% gas stations without own-brand stations < 50 km 31.25 50.85
Table 2. Comparing two substitute motorways: AP-2 (toll)/A-2 (free) 
Section Barcelona-Lleida AP-2 (toll) A-2 (free)
Length /Time 178 km/ 1h 49’ 163 km / 1h 59’
Nº of gas stations 8 15
HHI concentration index 10,000 4,933
C1 /C2 /C3 1/1/1 0.66/0.86/0.93
Average price €/l 0.70 0.68
Table 3. Level of concentration on the motorways by type 
Motorway 
(Tolled)
Nº of gas 
stations
C1 C2 C3 HHI
AP-1 6 0.67 1 1 5555.56
AP-2 14 1 1 1 10000
AP-4 4 1 1 1 10000
R-4 4 0.5 1 1 5000
R-5 4 1 1 1 10000
AP-6 4 1 1 1 10000
AP-7 49 0.55 0.76 0.96 3877.55
AP-8 8 0.75 1 1 6250
AP-9 10 0.6 1 1 5200
AP-15 5 1 1 1 10000
AP-36 6 1 1 1 10000
AP-66 4 1 1 1 10000
AP-68 16 1 1 1 10000
C-16 5 1 1 1 10000
C-32 8 0.875 1 1 7812.5
C-58 4 0.5 1 1 5000
A-1 57 0.46 0.63 0.74 2625.42
A-2 80 0.53 0.73 0.83 3281.25
A-3 53 0.47 0.66 0.77 2844.43
A-4 110 0.39 0.57 0.72 2166.94
N-IV 6 0.33 0.66 0.83 2777.78
A-5 47 0.53 0.68 0.77 3209.60
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Table 3. Level of concentration on the motorways (continued)
Motorway 
(Free)
Nº of gas
stations
C1 C2 C3 HHI
A-6 48 0.56 0.69 0.75 3463.54
A-7 73 0.41 0.55 0.66 2204.92
A-8 22 0.55 0.77 0.86 3677.69
A-10 5 0.4 0.6 0.8 2800
A-12 8 0.25 0.38 0.5 1562.5
A-15 4 0.5 0.75 1 3750
A-23 11 0.55 0.91 1 4380.17
A-30 6 0.5 0.83 1 3888.89
A-31 35 0.4 0.54 0.74 2326.53
A-35 5 0.4 0.8 1 3600
A-42 16 0.69 0.88 1 5234.38
A-43 8 0.5 0.63 0.75 3125
A-44 12 0.58 0.83 0.92 4166.67
A-45 6 0.83 1 1 7222.22
A-49 10 0.5 0.7 0.8 3200
A-52 8 0.5 0.75 0.88 3437.5
A-55 6 0.5 0.83 1 3888.89
A-62 32 0.44 0.72 0.84 2929.69
A-66 12 0.5 0.92 1 4305.56
A-67 7 0.43 0.71 0.86 3061.22
A-68 13 0.39 0.62 0.77 2426.04
A-92 64 0.36 0.52 0.66 1928.71
A-92G 6 0.5 0.67 0.83 3333.33
A-92N 9 0.3 0.56 0.78 2345.68
A-376 6 0.33 0.5 0.67 2222.22
A-381 4 0.5 0.75 1 3750
Ma-15 9 0.67 1 1 5555.56
A-231 5 0.4 0.8 1 3600
CL-601 5 0.8 1 1 6800
C-16 5 0.8 1 1 6800
C-17 14 0.36 0.57 0.71 2142.86
C-31 9 0.44 0.67 0.89 3086.42
C-68 4 0.5 0.75 1 3750
M-501 6 0.5 0.83 1 3888.89
M-506 8 0.38 0.75 1 3437.5
M-607 8 0.75 0.88 1 5937.5
RM-12 4 0.5 0.75 1 3750
RM-15 7 0.43 0.57 0.71 2653.06
B-23 6 0.67 0.83 1 5000
A-78 4 0.25 0.5 0.75 2500
LL-11 5 0.6 1 1 5200
M-50 4 1 1 1 10000
MA-21 9 0.44 0.67 0.78 2839.51
SC-20 4 0.75 1 1 6250
SE-30 4 0.5 0.75 1 3750
V-31 6 0.33 0.5 0.67 2222.22
Z-30 6 0.67 1 1 5555.56
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Table 4a. Effect of rivals and own-brand stations (instrumental variables)
5 km 10 km 15 km 20 km 25 km
Constant 1.091***
(0.005)
1.085***
(0.006)
1.087***
(0.007)
1.082***
(0.010)
1.073***
(0.017)
No rivals -0.004
(0.008)
-0.014**
(0.005)
-0.013**
(0.006)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.006)
No own-brand outlets 0.022
(0.023)
0.040**
(0.016)
0.026**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.013)
Cepsa 0.003
(0.005)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.015**
(0.007)
0.019**
(0.009)
0.023**
(0.011)
Shell -0.004
(0.007)
0.019**
(0.008)
0.023*
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.035**
(0.016)
Galp 0.009**
(0.004)
0.021***
(0.006)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.033***
(0.011)
0.040***
(0.013)
BP 0.001
(0.006)
0.019**
(0.008)
0.022*
(0.011)
0.029**
(0.012)
0.036**
(0.014)
Ind -0.002
(0.007)
0.018*
(0.010)
0.024*
(0.013)
0.033**
(0.014)
0.037**
(0.017)
No obs. 766 766 766 766 766
R2 0.9996 0.9993 0.9993 0.9991 0.9990
F 3.30***
(0.0043)
2.58**
(0.0197)
4.34***
(0.0005)
2.78**
(0.0130)
3.22***
(0.0051)
Anderson LR statistic 16.116**
(0.0408)
24.338***
(0.0020)
28.536***
(0.0004)
24.117***
(0.0022)
16.769**
(0.0112)
Hansen J statistic 10.899
(0.1431)
11.363
(0.1236)
7.233
(0.4050)
6.612
(0.4704)
2.894
(0.8947)
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Table 4b. Effect of rivals and own-brand stations (instrumental variables)
5 km 10 km 15 km 20 km 25 km
Constant 1.088***
(0.005)
1.084***
(0.006)
1.085***
(0.006)
1.082***
(0.008)
1.077***
(0.011)
No rivals -0.001
(0.008)
-0.012**
(0.006)
-0.013**
(0.006)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.010
(0.006)
No own-brand outlets 0.016
(0.018)
0.031***
(0.012)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.024***
(0.010)
0.024***
(0.009)
Toll 0.010
(0.008)
0.008
(0.007)
0.003
(0.007)
0.004
(0.009)
0.003
(0.012)
24 hours 0.003
(0.002)
0.004
(0.002)
0.005*
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
Cepsa 0.00006
(0.003)
0.009**
(0.004)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.016**
(0.007)
0.018**
(0.009)
Shell -0.005
(0.006)
0.014**
(0.007)
0.021*
(0.012)
0.026**
(0.012)
0.032**
(0.016)
Galp 0.007**
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.008)
0.030***
(0.010)
0.037***
(0.012)
BP -0.001
(0.005)
0.015**
(0.006)
0.020*
(0.010)
0.027**
(0.011)
0.033**
(0.013)
Independent -0.002
(0.006)
0.015
(0.008)
0.023*
(0.013)
0.031**
(0.031)
0.036**
(0.015)
Dist. Sto. -6.60e-12
(8.25e-12)
-8.34e-12
(1.29e-11)
1.27e-12
(1.30e-11)
9.52e-13
(1.30e-11)
-3.41e-12
(1.66e-11)
No obs. 765 765 765 765 765
R2 0.9997 0.9994 0.9994 0.9992 0.9992
F 3.65***
(0.0006)
5.69***
(0.0075)
4.38***
(0.0001)
3.49***
(0.0009)
3.86***
(0.0003)
Anderson LR statistic 17.667**
(0.0239)
24840***
(0.0017)
19.951**
(0.0105)
15.697**
(0.0469)
10.314
(0.2437)
Hansen J statistic 10.691
(0.1527)
11.641
(0.1130)
7.713
(0.3586)
6.538
(0.4785)
2.913
(0.8930)
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Table 5. Effect of toll without market structure variables (Least Squares)
Constant 1.092***
(0.002)
1.090***
(0.002)
1.091***
(0.002)
Toll 0.009**
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.005)
Cepsa -0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
Shell -0.008***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.003)
Galp 0.007***
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.002)
BP -0.011
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.010)
Independent -0.010***
(0.003)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.010***
(0.003)
24 hours 0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
Dist. Sto. -3.41e-12
(5.63e-12)
No obs. 1173 1170 1170
R2 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995
F 7.44***
(0.0000)
7.58***
(0.0000)
6.59***
(0.0000)
Table 6. Effect of neighboring rivals (Least Squares)
Tolled Free
Constant 1.096***
(0.007)
1.096***
(0.007)
1.095***
(0.007)
1.097***
(0.006)
1.094***
(0.002)
1.093***
(0.002)
1.096***
(0.002)
1.093***
(0.002)
Before 0.007
(0.005)
0.006
(0.005)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.001)
After 0.007
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.005***
(0.002)
-0.004***
(0.002)
Both 0.006
(0.004)
-0.006***
(0.001)
Shell -0.004
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
Cepsa 0.004
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
Galp 0.012*
(0.006)
0.012*
(0.006)
0.010
(0.006)
0.012*
(0.007)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.002)
BP 0.023***
(0.005)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.021***
(0.005)
0.024***
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.005)
R2 0.0823 0.0835 0.0981 0.0720 0.0319 0.0290 0.0383 0.0378
N 152 152 152 152 1004 1004 1004 1004
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Figure 1. Number of rival gas stations by type of motorway and distance.
 
Figure 2. Share of gas stations without competition by type of motorway and distance 
(%)
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Figure 3. Number of own brand gas stations by type of motorway and distance.
 
 
 
Figure 4. Share of own brand gas stations by type of motorway and distance
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Figure 5. Price simulations
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